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Abstract
This paper examines the decision making process of two
local banking institutions, Fleet Bank and Bank of
Boston, that are attempting to manage and dispose of
bank owned real estate assets. The organizational units
responsible for the disposition of the property are
studied to determine the important factors affecting
their ability to dispose of assets in a stagnant
marketplace. The hiring of real estate professionals by
the banks to help dispose of the assets is documented
and discussed.
A significant portion of the work for this thesis
involved interviewing the management and staff of the
banking units and other real estate brokerage and
property management firms in order to determine the key
factors affecting each step of the disposition process.
These factors are compared against three decision
making models from the literature with the use of a
Decision Analysis Matrix. The intent of this exercise
is to identify the important issues at each step of the
disposition process. Consideration is given to the
constraints and opportunities facing each firm.
The decision making strategies used by banks are most
influenced by environmental factors including the role
of the regulatory agency, activity in the marketplace
and financial condition of the institution. The success
of asset disposition will depend on utilizing creative
and innovative selling techniques. Receivership
companies employing real estate professionals have an
advantage over bank OREO departments in this regard.
Thesis Supervisor: Gloria Schuck
Title: Lecturer
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
"The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to
the observer - often, indeed, to the decider himself....
There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in
the decision-making process - mysterious to those who may
be most intimately involved."
(John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1963)
The depressed real estate industry in the northeastern
United States is the end result of a complex series of
changes in the capital markets and banking regulations, lax
regulatory oversight, and agressive overbuilding even in the
face of declining market indicators. Fueled by an economic
recession, the resulting drop in real estate values has
caused many real estate loans to be undercollaterlized.
Therefore, the banks have accepted deeds in lieu of
foreclosure or have foreclosed on the loaned property in an
attempt to salvage value.
Because of additional pressure put on banking institutions
by federal regulators to fairly value their assets, the
banks have written off loan losses and increased loan
foreclosure proceedings in order to improve their capital to
assets ratio. The result of this process has led to a
tremendous increase in the number of Other Real Estate Owned
(OREO) properties held by banks. Ranging from single family
homes to resort complexes, these properties are being
proferred by the banks in an illiquid and saturated
marketplace.
The effort to manage and market these assets has forced many
banks to retain, hire or train real estate professionals
without prior banking experience. Although the larger banks
have used real estate brokers, architects, and construction
management professionals to evaluate complex development
proposals, the current situation has made necessary the
formation of organizational units, subsidiaries or
receiverships to handle the large numbers of properties.
This thesis will explore the factors affecting the decision
making process within these organizations. Also, the role of
the real estate professionals will be analyzed to determine
how they are being used to make effective property
disposition decisions. The major questions are:
1. According to the academic literature, what are
the important steps in the decision making process and
what models have been created to analyze this process?
2. How have the banks structured their real estate
disposition departments? What are the critical factors
affecting their managerial decision making?
3. Is the organization's disposition decision process
appropriate for the task at hand? How are real estate
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professionals being utilized by banking institutions?
Maine Credit Holdings, Inc., a subsidiary of Fleet Bank
based in Portland, Maine and the Bank of Boston OREO
Department were chosen to be studied. These organizations
have portfolios of OREO properties over $100 million and are
employing real estate professionals in different capacities
in an effort to liquidate their real estate assets.
The study begins in Chapter One with a historical review of
the conditions which precipitated the current glut in bank
owned property and ends with a description of the current
market conditions. Chapter Two will present the literature
review on managerial decision making models and a Decision
Analysis Matrix used to analyze the organizational decision
making. Chapter Three will present the research methodology,
background material and data gathered on Maine Credit
Holdings, Inc. and the Bank of Boston OREO Department. The
data will be analyzed using the Decision Analysis Matrix,
contrasting and comparing the field research gathered from
each firm with the decision making models. The thesis will
conclude, in Chapter Four, by commenting on the implications
of the research and the larger issues affecting OREO
disposition decision making.
CHAPTER ONE
Historical Influences and Current Issues
The proliferation of bank owned property for sale in the
Northeast is the latest evidence that a regional real estate
industry recession is in a mature stage. According to
Sheshunoff Information Services Inc. of Austin, Texas, which
compiles data from the federal government, New England banks
held $2.9 billion in OREO properties at year end 1990
(Suskind, 1991, p. Al). The increasing number of savings and
loan failures in New England mirrors the decimation of S&Ls
across the country during the last five years, but only
during the last two years have the commercial banks had
problems of the same magnitude with nonperforming assets.
(Loans are classified as nonperforming when they are at
least 90 days past due, nonaccruing, or renegotiated.
Nonperforming assets are defined as nonperforming loans plus
"other real estate owned" (OREO), which consists of
foreclosed real estate (Simons, 1990, p.55)). Though these
banking problems are not confined to the Northeast (Texas
has had far more failures), the Northeast has recently had
the most publicized incidents, including the Bank of New
England, in February of 1991. OREO sales for New England
exceeded $500 million in 1990 and are expected to surpass
$750 million in 1991 (Rowan, 1991, p. S2).
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its baseline
forecast, predicted that 180 banks would fail nationwide in
1991 mostly due to real estate loans or commercial and
consumer loans secured with real estate. By April of 1991,
53 banks had failed (Wall Street Journal, 1991, p. A7). Of
these 53, 16 were located in New England (Heymann, 1991,
p.11). At year end 1990, banks nationwide held $77.6 billion
in nonperforming assets of which half are direct real estate
loans or commercial or consumer loans secured by real
estate. Federal regulators expect that $40 billion of the
$78 billion will eventually find its way to OREO status
(Suskind, 1991, p. Al).
The conditions which caused the current phenomena were
created over the last fifteen years and are the result of
unanticipated and historic forces of change. The broad scope
of the changes has fundamentally altered the process of real
estate lending and directly affected the savings and loans
institutions and the commercial banks by increasing default
and foreclosure risks. Changes in banking and savings and
loan regulation, tax codes, capital markets, and structural
demand changes for real estate products have all contributed
to an upheaval in real estate lending patterns and led to
the current crisis for the banks.
Regulatory Changes
The most important legislation affecting real estate lending
passed during the last fifteen years were the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.
In order to counter "disintermediation" in the financial
markets (shifting of deposits from banks and S&Ls to money
market funds in times of high inflation), the Depository
Institutions Act accelerated the deregulation of deposit
pricing so banks and S&Ls could offer high interest accounts
to remain competitive with money market funds. The Garn-St.
Germain Act granted the S&Ls the additional power to
participate in commercial real estate lending and
development (Bryan, 1991, p.77). Deposit growth, for the
savings and loans institutions, increased astronomically
after 1980.
Unfortunately, though the banks and S&Ls were given new
powers to offer higher rates on deposits and engage in
risker activities, the federal government still insured the
deposits. By the 1985, the insurance coverage was up to
$100,000 per account. Exposed to little risk, the
institutions conducted unprecedented real estate lending
activity during the early 1980s as they sought greater
revenues to offset their increased cost of funds. In the
banking industry, real estate loans doubled from 1980 to
1989 totaling $760 billion dollars (Hill, 1990, p. R5). Due
to the huge volume of lending, underwriting standards were
less strict at the banks and the oversight by federal and
state regulators was lacking. As a result, the quality of
the real estate loan portfolios suffered.
Other important changes in the real estate lending patterns
of banks and S&Ls led to a greater number of riskier loans
being processed. For example, insurance companies, under
pressure to show higher returns to investors, opted more
frequently for shorter real estate lending commitments than
the traditional 20 or 30 year take out mortgages. All
lenders, because of the interest rate shocks of the early
1980s, reevaluated loan underwriting standards. As this
permanent lending slowed, banks started to offer "uncovered"
construction loans (loans without permanent financing
arranged prior to construction) and three to five year
"mini-perms". The competition between banks, mutual savings
banks, and thrifts to place funds in the more profitable,
yet more risky, real estate lending business increased
(Wyman, 1988).
Tax Law Changes
The interest in real estate as an investment product was
greatly affected by two important pieces of tax law
legislation passed during the 1980s. In 1981, the Economic
Recovery Act provided tax incentives for individuals to
invest in real estate by allowing accelerated cost recovery
of an asset through a 15 year depreciation schedule. Also,
because of the pressure to shelter income from taxes, a
class of syndicators was formed which acquired property
based on tax benefits rather than rental streams. The deals
were highly leveraged, with financing obtained through banks
and S&LS, in order to create losses for the syndication
participants. Once Congress learned of the tax avoiding
nature of these investments they quickly changed the rules.
In 1986, the Tax Reform Act sought to limit any activity,
such as the aforementioned tax shelters, that resulted in an
unintended tax advantage (Schwartz, 1987, p. 29). Rental
real estate and real estate activities, that previously
enjoyed unrestricted benefits in the form of tax credits,
were the most severely hit. Unable to utilize the losses
generated by the highly leveraged deal structures to offset
income, syndication participants were forced to invest more
equity into questionable projects as markets softened. From
1986 until the present, increasing numbers of these
syndications have gone bankrupt and turned the keys to the
real estate over to the lenders.
Capital Market Changes
The most significant effect of changes in the capital
markets was to drive business away from the banking
institutions and cause them to look to for more profitable,
thus riskier, loans. Corporations, instead of borrowing from
banks for working capital, started issuing commercial paper.
The use of commercial paper by corporations increased by
four times during the 1980s (Byran, 1991, p.76). Also,
securitization of other assets, including residential
mortgages, drew huge volumes of business away from banks.
Disaggregation of lending activities led to the startup of
large numbers of specialized firms, such as mortgage
companies, that could outperform larger banking enterprises
that had more costly overhead.
Banking firms were unable to respond to these fundamental
changes because of existing laws regulating their
fundamental business. The McFadden Act of 1927 and the Bank
Holding Act of 1970 made it impossible for banks to
consolidate their activities. Although some states passed
enabling legislation in the early 1980s that allowed out of
state banks to compete within their borders, the existing
federal regulations were still significant impediments to
competitiveness.
Structural Demand Changes
The two most important changes in demand during the 1980s
for real estate product, especially office buildings, were
the aging of the baby boom generation and the slowing rate
of women participation in the labor force. Thus, the two
largest users of space were decreasing as the decade drew to
a close.
To illustrate this point, contracting for commercial
building (offices, stores/shopping centers, hotels and
apartments) had fallen by 50 percent, from 1500 million
square feet in 1985 to 750 million square feet in 1990. Yet
there was still a surplus of commercial space. For offices
alone, estimates of the principal sources of demand (growth
of the white collar work force, space per worker,
replacement of space, relocation, etc.) indicated that an
average of about 250 million square feet per year would have
been appropriate for the mid 1980s. However, in 1985 and
1986, supply peaked at 350 million square feet per year,
exceeding demand by 30 percent (Christie, 1990, p. 33).
Reform Attempts
When the oil industry went into recession in 1983-1984 in
the Southwest, the banks and savings and loans started
facing enormous losses due to their real estate related
assets. By 1989, nonperforming real estate assets in Texas
banks stood at $7 billion and accounted for 76 percent of
all nonperforming assets. As a result of these loan losses,
from 1986 to 1989, Texas banks lost over $6 billion (Simons,
1990, p.56). When the Northeast economic boom started to
fade in the late 1980s institutions in the region started
feeling the same heavy weight of nonperforming assets.
Nationwide, the savings and loan and banking system was
headed toward collapse.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA) was designed to overhaul the regulatory
structure of the U.S. thrift industry and to provide funding
to close hundreds of insolvent thrifts. FIRREA has
strenghtened the capital requirements of institutions,
increased supervisory oversight and allowed consolidation of
the S&L industry (Sczudio, 1990, p.13). S&Ls can now be
acquired by bank holding companies under the regulatory
oversight of the FDIC. In New England, larger bank holding
companies such as the Bank of Boston and Fleet Bank are
purchasing many insolvent thrifts and banks.
Banking system reform discussions are focused on making
several changes: recapitalizing the deposit insurance system
through increased premiums; creating so called "narrow
banks" under which the insured depository bank's portfolio
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would be limited to safe, liquid assets; allowing banks to
engage in a broader range of financial services activities
and; allowing nationwide banking (Sczudio, 1990, pp. 14-15).
The reform proposals being discussed in Congress during the
spring of 1991 have become a top priority because of the
poor condition of the banking system. The historical changes
in real estate lending practices during the 1980s and the
current recession affecting the market have made OREO
management and disposition the most important issue for many
lending firms. Nonperforming assets and OREO properties are
compounding the financial dilemma faced by undercapitalized
banks.
Issues in the Management of OREO Properties
Many of the issues raised in the beginning of this chapter
affect how banks manage and market OREO properties. Current
and pending legislation, political pressures, tax
implications, market demand, and restructuring of the real
estate industry are issues which directly affect bank
decision making on nonperforming real estate assets and
owned property.
Banks may take direct title to a property or form a separate
subsidiary to own and operate their real estate portfolios.
By using a separate entity to take title to a property,
banks can often avoid adverse publicity associated with the
ownership of foreclosed property, and, at the same time,
centralize management responsibility for the operation and
disposal of such property. Most important, by forming a
separate entity, banks may be able to reduce their exposure
to potential liability associated with owning and operating
a foreclosed property (Pappone, 1990, p.50). For
institutions (or a subsidiary entity) that has gained title
to a property by foreclosure, deed in lieu of foreclosure or
forfeiture on a contract, a number of steps are usually
followed to manage and market the property effectively. The
institution is keen on disposing of the property because
OREO is included in the accounting category of "scheduled
items", whether it is held in a separate entity or not.
Therefore, they must maintain specific loan loss reserves
(usually totaling 20% of scheduled items), that are
unavailable for lending on mortgages or other business. The
opportunity cost of this idle capital is significant for the
firm.
When title passes to a lender, the lender must assume all
the maintenance and management tasks of a property owner.
Generally, the lender reviews the local real estate market
conditions and its own financial picture in order to decide
whether to sell the property "as is", even at a large loss;
to repair and refurbish first, then sell quickly; or to
retain the property until sales conditions are more
favorable.
The ideal situation for a firm would be to sell at a price
equal to the loan balance plus administrative and legal
costs plus a profit. However, dreams rarely come true,
especially in depressed markets. Typically, the sales price
is lower than the outstanding debt on the property so a loss
is realized which is deducted from reserves. If there is no
market for the property, the firm can resort to the concept
of "salvage powers" in order to justify additional capital
expenditures on the property in order to create enough value
to interest buyers (American Savings and Loan Institute,
1971, p. 404).
Because of regulations and accounting principles, lending
institutions are not interested in buying or selling real
estate or holding real estate for investment purposes.
Federal regulations limit bank ownership of OREO properties
to five years. However, the unwritten concept of salvage
powers states that a corporation has not only the power but
the duty to salvage as best it can any asset of the
corporation which cannot be liquidated by ordinary means.
Therefore, banks can invest capital into a property if they
can justify the action.
There are strict accounting principles which must be
followed by the banks when handling OREO properties. The
most important, relating directly to the sale of OREO, is
the Financial Accounting Standards Board Number 66. FASB 66
stipulates that a bank cannot recognize a sale if the
institution retains certain indications of ownership or
continuing involvement with a property. When a bank makes a
loan to a purchaser of a repossessed asset to facilitate a
sale there are specific rules that prevent banks from
recognizing gain unless they do not have any continuing
involvement with the property. They also cannot sell assets
at a inflated prices by offering favorable financing terms.
The administration of OREO property depends in large part on
the size and diversity of the portfolio and the size of the
institution holding the portfolio. Until recently, most
institutions had a few individuals in-house to manage and
sell a small number of properties. Today, the largest banks
are employing many workout officers, asset managers and
marketing managers to handle hundreds of millions of dollars
of assets.
An OREO manager should become involved with a property
before the title actually passes to the firm. State
foreclosure laws vary on issues from occupation of the
property, lease contracts and collection of rents while a
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property is being foreclosed upon, and the process may take
up to eighteen months to complete. Also, there is a period
of time called the "twilight zone" at the end of a
foreclosure when a mortgagor has the right to redemption of
the property (Mortgage Bankers Association, 1989, p. 27).
For instance, if a debtor files Chapter 11 under the U.S.
bankruptcy code, they can receive an automatic stay of
foreclosure on mortgaged assets. The foreclosure can be
postponed indefinitely while the debtor drafts a plan to
reorganize and pay creditors. While these proceedings are
ongoing, an appraisal and market analysis can be done on the
property and the property can be pre-listed with a local
broker.
Once clear title is in hand, the goal is to plan the best
way to recapture the largest possible share of the
investment in the property, taking into consideration the
total sum invested to date and the administrative costs of
disposing or holding the property. Immediate steps that are
taken include setting up accounting records to reflect the
transfer to OREO status; changing all necessary insurance
over to the firm's name and checking the amount of the
coverage; inspecting the property for repairs and setting up
a maintenance schedule and; ensuring the property is secure
(American Savings and Loan Institute, 1971, pp. 405-406).
Budgets and business plans are created for each property.
The complexity of these plans is linked to the value of the
asset. For instance, for a single family home, a business
plan might entail a single appraisal and a listing with a
local broker. For a half-built office building, it might
cover a comprehensive construction budget and a
sophisticated marketing campaign.
The evaluation of a sell versus hold decision should be made
after gathering all relevant data on the real estate
investment. The quality of the local market is determined by
checking selling prices, length of time on the market, and
financing terms, or, if its commercial property, the rental
rates, vacancy levels, and lease lengths. The analysis of
the selling prices for various properties is made using data
collected from independent registered appraisers, brokers,
and in-house analysts. Because appraisers use past sales to
calculate value and brokers tend to look at current value,
in-house analysts often are used to rectify discrepancies
(Mortgage Bankers Association, 1989, pp. 42-44).
Before a reliable decision can be made with regard to the
ultimate disposition of a problem asset, a thorough analysis
of the project's current and projected operations should be
undertaken. The net present value (NPV) for each alternative
disposition scenario should be computed. Computations should
be based on the analyst's realistic assessment as to the
trend of future income and expenses. The economic
performance of the project must be analyzed in terms of cash
flow, capitalized expenditures, accruals, debt service, and
return to the owners. Any discrepancies between the asset
manager's analysis and the appraisal should be examined.
Assumptions as -to comparables, sales, leases, and holding
costs should be scrutinized vigorously. A realistic
assessment of the various market assumptions, as well as
other economic factors, allows the analyst to compute an NPV
for each of the project alternatives. For projects held for
a period of time pending market turnaround, sales proceeds
must be projected utilizing a realistic capitalization rate
deemed appropriate for the end of the period. An analysis of
future sales proceeds should enable the asset manager to
make a recommendation as to whether a project should be
promptly liquidated on an "as is" basis or be held pending a
projected turnaround of the marketplace (Myers, 1989, p.
58).
Some local firms have capitalized on the demand for asset
management services by creating Special Asset Groups. The
goal is to fully support an institution through the
restructure, foreclosure, and disposition of an asset. Asset
Management Disposition Plans are created for each of the
bank's properties and are designed to provide a comparison
of the returns from various alternative disposition
scenarios (Hunneman Real Estate Corporation, 1991).
The disposition of OREO can be made with the use of inside
brokers, independent brokers, and auctions. Independent
brokers are typically given three to four month exclusive
listings for each property but are required to document
their activity on the properties on a weekly or biweekly
basis. Also, though the exclusive listing precludes other
independent brokers from working on the property, brokers
working at the lending institution can actively pursue leads
and negotiate sales on OREO properties. OREO managers can
use other types of selling techniques such as bulk sales of
assets, tenant sales, and retail project sales (for
condominium projects when a large number of units are
unsold).
The use of auctions by OREO departments is becoming an
increasingly popular method of property disposition by the
FDIC, RTC and the banks. They are selecting auctions, rather
than a convential sale, because their carrying costs are so
high, they need quick sales, and the market is "thin"
(without many buyers). Auctions can be conducted as
"absolute" or "reserve". Absolute auction refers to an
auction at which the property is sold to the highest bidder,
regardless of price. Reserve auction refers to an auction at
which the seller establishes a minimum bid or target price
below which the property will not be sold. Auctioning is
easier than extended retail marketing, but it still requires
a lot of work by the lender to get from a bid to a closing.
There are a tremendous number of issues for the banks to
consider when they become owners instead of creditors of
real estate. Even in a strong market, they must make
decisions on OREO management and disposition that are
unfamiliar and unconvential. In a weak market, the banks'
situation is further complicated by the severe negative
impact on earnings. The ability to make decisions that
reduce expenses on and recapture value from the
nonperforming assets is crucial.
******* ** * * *** ******
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review and Analytical Framework
Banks are in the real estate business. This phenomenon is
generating tremendous interest among real estate brokers and
consultants, buyers and sellers, and regulators and
researchers. Everyone has their own opinion on how the banks
got into this situation and what strategies they are using
to manage and sell property. All agree that banks must get
rid of their OREO property in order to improve their balance
sheets and return to their primary business of lending
money. This chapter will introduce a Decision Analysis
Matrix which will be used to compare and contrast the
decision making of Maine Credit Holdings, Inc. and the Bank
of Boston/OREO Department. The intent is to identify the
important factors which impact or influence the banks as
they acquire, market and sell property.
Decision making on the management and disposition of
property is highly complex, even on the smallest of assets.
Organizations pursue those actions and utilize those
strategies that will maximize benefits to the firm and meet
stated goals and objectives. By analyzing the decision
making within two OREO organizations, one can better
understand the complexity of issues which face the banks
that have possession of properties. It is not always clear
to an outside observer what influences the bank's setting of
objectives, evaluation of alternatives, and choice making
strategies.
For each firm, I will evaluate the data against the three
decision making models. Each model provides a different
"lens" with which to view the organization's process of OREO
management and disposition. Graham Allison (1971) in
"Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis",
used this method to examine the famous international
incident which occurred in 1962. The three models used by
Allison were the Rational Model, the Organizational Model,
and the Political Model. The relative influence or impact of
various issues affecting or implementing decision making can
be weighed in a systematic manner as the data is compared
and contrasted, step by step, with each model's attributes.
The following three sections of this chapter provide
information to the reader from the decision making
literature. The first section, Models, will introduce the
three decision making models used by Allison in his work
and summarize the key assumptions and conditions. The second
section, The Decision Process, will review additional
literature on decision making and define the basic steps of
the decision process -setting of objectives, search and
evaluation of alternatives, choice making, and
implementation and evaluation of decisions. The last
section, Analytical Framework, will review the Decision
Analysis Matrix and describe how it will be used to study
the organizations.
MODELS
Researchers create models to help explain or identify real
world phenomena. Three common models are used in this paper
to analyze the bank's decision making on OREO management and
disposition. Before the models are introduced the following
general aspects of models deserve emphasis:
1. A model is a simple version of a more complex reality.
2. The purpose of a model is to illuminate a real life
phenomenon: some simplification is required for ease
of understanding and for clarity.
3. Although simplified, the view of reality presented by
a model does include its main elements and often their
relationships; only the nonessentials are omitted.
4. The model depicts reality for a particular purpose and
a particular audience.
5. A model is an intellectual tool, a device that assists
in the thought process. Its value therefore is to be
assessed primarily by the validity of the conclusions
or decisions to which it leads.
6. A model can be expressed in a wide variety of media.
(Oxenfeldt, 1978, p. 32)
The models presented below are some of the most frequently
discussed in the literature. Many other highly technical
models have been constructed, including detailed probability
and risk/reward flowcharts, but I am taking a qualitative
approach to this thesis, to find out how and why decisions
are made. The models chosen are tools to assist the thought
process, not to draw absolute conclusions.
The Rational Model is called the classical approach to
decision making. It provides the foundation for the
quantitative disciplines of economics, mathematics, and
statistics. Rationality refers to consistent, value
maximizing choice within specified constraints. (Allison,
1971, pg.30) The Rational Model is especially useful to
analyze routine, computational decisions. The objectives are
fixed, short term and utility maximizing. It is assumed in
this model that a decision maker is aware of all options and
costs of information. There are no constraints from the time
required and cost to obtain information. A truly rational
choice therefore requires the generation of all possible
alternatives, assessment of the probabilities of each, and
the evaluation of each set of consequences for all relevant
goals. Non numerical variables are totally disregarded. The
choice to be made is based on the net evaluation of the
consequences of each set of alternatives. The alternative
with the highest payoff or utility is chosen.
Since the choice is based on the h±ghest assigned value,
there is no post evaluation of the dedision. Also, the
decision making environment is disregarded because of the
assumption that all choices and consequences are known. It
is essentially a closed system. As Simon (1957, p.71) said,
"(The Rational Model) requires powers of prescience and
capacities for computation resembling those we usually
attribute to God."
The Organizational Model is a combination of the behavioral
disciplines with quantitative analysis. In contrast to the
Rational Model, this model acknowledges the constraints of
limited information, cognitive limitations, and time and
cost limitations. As such, the Organizational Model
introduces the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and
sociology into the decision making situation. (Harrison,
1981, p. 58) The model is useful in analyzing decisions that
are more complex and require more creative solutions.
The objectives of decision makers operating under this model
are typically to seek attainable or satisficing decisions.
Satisficing behavior occurs when decision makers do not have
all the alternatives related to a given choice. Therefore,
they seek a course of action that is "good enough" to attain
their objectives. Because the problems they face are often
complex and involve large numbers of people, organizations
often resort to standard operating procedures to determine
decision choices. The first satisfactory alternative evoked
in the search activity is accepted. The strategy of choice
making is characterized by judgement or the use of rules of
thumb. The firm seeks to avoid uncertainty by solving
pressing problems rather than developing long range
strategies. Implementation occurs via policy and procedure.
The decision choices are influenced by and sensitive to
constraints from the external environment. The model is open
to environmental influences and accepts outcomes on their
qualitative as well as quantitative merits. The firm is
qualitatively and quantitatively evaluating decisions and
replacing the first choice with another if the first is
unacceptable.
The Political Model is based on the disciplines of political
science, philosophy, psychology, and sociology. The
objectives of a Political Model decision are to have the
choice be acceptable to a large number of external
constituencies. Only a small number of alternatives and
evaluation of a limited number of consequences occurs, but
the problem itself is constantly redefined (Harrison, 1981,
p. 60). Countless ends-means and means-ends adjustments are
made. The strategy used is one of compromise and bargining
in order to satisfy the external constituencies.
Consequently, the environment is the dominant issue
affecting decision making under this model especially during
the consideration of alternatives and choice making
strategy. The Political Model recognizes also that there is
power shared by all the actors within the system.
Differences in the focus, responsibilities, perceptions, and
priorities among players focusing on slightly different
factors of a complex issue permits each player to be
involved (Allison, 1971, p. 154).
The principal differences between the Rational and
Organizational models, and Political model are: (1)
objective setting and alternative search is accomplished
concurrently in the Rational and Organizational models,
rather than sequentially as in the Political model, (2) ends
and means in the Political model are not distinct, (3) a
good Political model decision is when most of the players
agree on the outcome, (4) there is a minimal amount of
analysis of alternatives in the political model, (5)
uncertainty in a political model is minimized by proceeding
incremently and comparing outcomes with established
policies. (Allison, 1971, p. 154)
THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
This section will provide more information on the typical
decision making steps listed previously - setting of
objectives, search and evaluation of alternatives, choice
making, and implementation and evaluation of decisions. Each
step is separate but it is also part of the generic decision
process. The same general skills and principles are used by
all decision makers. Oxenfelt (1978, p.3), in A Basic
Approach to Executive Decision Making says;
"The performance of most executives as decision makers
can be substantially upgraded if they master a systematic
approach to decision - one that permits them to make
better use of what they know and to use the assistance of
others effectively."
Most of the literature I reviewed stated that a systematic
approach is best in any decision making. Assuming this is
true, some questions could be posed about banks selling real
estate; Are banking institutions in the Northeast,
struggling to rid themselves of OREO property in an illiquid
marketplace, utilizing an effective, systematic approach to
property disposition? Are they effectively using what they,
and others, know? Are they following a decision making
process that will allow them to meet their objectives of
economical property management and disposition? Do they
recognize those critical factors which influence the
process? To help answer these questions, it is helpful to
look at how decisions are made.
Decisions are a sequence of steps. Each step is a function,
one of a group of related actions contributing to a larger
action. The functions of decision making are 1) setting of
objectives - the process starts with this step and ends when
the objectives have been reached, 2) search for and
evaluation of alternatives - this involves scanning the
internal and external environments for relevant information
and using the information most likely to fulfill the
objectives, 3) choice making - the moment when the decision
maker chooses a given course of action, 4) implementation -
when the choice is transformed into an operational reality,
and 5) post evaluation of decisions -ensuring that
implemented decisions result in a outcome consistent with
the objective. Several researchers have created diagrams to
show the interrelationships of these functions. Moody (1983,
p.1) has created the following closed loop process:
Become conscious Recognize the Analyze
of problem problem and potential
or action its definition alternatives
and consequences
Provide Implement the Select the
feedback decision Solution
Environment
Figure 1: Decision-making Loop
Moody, 1983, p. 1
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His general framework emphasizes the important steps needed
to reach optimal choices in organizational decision making.
Though the figure shows a sequential process with definite
boundaries at each step, there is often overlapping activity
between functions. Rarely are problems so clear cut that
each step is isolated from the others.
Harrison (1981, p.25) has created a similar closed loop
process shown in Figure 2 on page 37. He has drawn his
diagram as a dynamic process with the same general steps as
Moody's and has attempted to simulate decision making as a
continuous activity taking place over a period of time. He
also suggests that a decision making process can be used to
direct and control problem solving activities within the
organization. For instance, once a problem is studied, the
original objectives can be modified utilizing new
information which has been gathered durimg the alternative
search or evaluation steps:
Environment
Figure 2: The Decision-Making Process
Harrison, 1981, p. 25
Some of the decision steps are particularly important. The
search for and evaluation of alternatives is a critical
phase of the decision process. At some point in any search,
the cost of acquiring additional information outweighs the
benefits derived from the information. Firms must recognize
that a decision is an action that must be taken when there
is no more time for gathering information. Therefore, if
they evaluate the relative magnitude of a problem they can
decide how much information is needed to reduce uncertainty.
At some point, the costs outweigh the benefits. In Figure 3,
Moody (1983, p.6) graphically represents this search for an
optimal decision:
Revise
objectives
Comparing and
evaluating
alternatives
The act
of choice
Take corrective
action as necessary
Optimum
decision
Total
cost
Cost Cost of gathering
data or facts
-SSavings related to a
better decision
Time
Figure 3: Optimum Decision Point Curve
Moody, 1983, p. 6
Probably the most significant influence on the decision
process steps is the environment. Moody and Harrison
recognize that decision making takes place in an
interdisciplinary environment. The environment includes all
the conditions and circumstances that affect the
organization or any of its internal systems. It exerts a
pervasive influence on the managerial decision making
process in formal organizations. It affects the selection of
objectives, bounds the search for alternatives, constrains
the evaluation of alternatives, determines strategy, and
directly prejudices the acceptance of an implemented choice.
Various environmental forces including the economic system,
political system, social system and technology, cause
decision makers to act or react in certain ways. Thus, the
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environment of a given organization is a significant
determinant in managerial decision making.
A hypothetical example may help explain the decision making
steps and the role of the environment. For a private
individual or company in possession of an office building
that they desire to sell, the objective is to obtain
maximum value for the property. The search for alternatives
may entail a thorough analysis of the costs of selling
immediately, improving the property and selling, or holding
and selling at a later date. The choice making strategy may
depend solely on a net present value analysis of the
alternative choices or they may consider other issues in
their analysis. Possibly, the individual or company would
take be willing to offer attractive subordinate financing to
the buyer or contemplate a "like kind exchange" because of
tax reasons. The implementation of the choice is to sell the
building through local brokers with a Purchase and Sale
agreement drawn up by the company, or improve the property
as desired. Finally, there would be an evaluation of
decision choice at some future date to see if the process
achieved the desired objective. The environment of the
decision making would comprise those external factors
influencing the choice making including local market
conditions, financing issues, or tax implications.
Other researchers, including Simon (1960, p.1), Witte (1972,
pp.156-182) and Frederickson (1971, pp.25-52), have proposed
decision making processes similar to those described above.
In constrast, other researchers believe that decision making
by a rational method does not fully replicate reality. For
instance, instead of a controlled sequential process that
relies on a careful analysis of all the important
information, decision making is often the result of an
arbitrary process influenced by personalities or
environmental actions. Boulding (1978) states that certainty
of data, especially numerical data, is an illusion,
therefore rationalized models of decision making must be
flawed. Rowe (1974) believes that carefully controlled
decision making by executives is a myth, the personal
preferences of the executive usually determining the choice
to be made. For example, when Avis moved its headquarters
from Boston to Long Island in the 1970s they did so because
the executives did not want to move to Boston or commute
into Manhattan. Publically, they said they wanted to be near
the airports and a good labor pool.
James March (1976) studied organizational and managerial
decision making and found that ambiguity of intention and
understanding was common. The observations in his work were;
(1) organizations do nothing to implement a decision after
having devoted much time, energy and enthusiasm to making
it, (2) major decisions are made with minor participation by
key administrators and significant constituents, (3)
managers struggle over participation rights in decision
making with an indifference to exercising them, and (4)
arguments are often made over ideology without effective
action.
While acknowledging the validity of this other research, for
the purposes of this paper, Allison's decision analysis
method will be used.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The decision making processes at Maine Credit Holdings, Inc.
and the Bank of Boston OREO department will be evaluated
using the Decision Analysis Matrix shown in Figure 4 on page
42. The previous sections identified 1) the attributes of
three decision making models and 2) a five step generic
decision process. The Matrix lists the models across the top
of the page and the decision steps down the left hand
column.
The attributes of each model are listed across from the
appropriate decision making step. The data from each company
will compared and contrasted to each model at each step. For
instance, I will document whether the firm's objective
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setting function is closest to the Rational, organizational
or Political Models attributes. The analysis will look at
the reasons for the differences or similarities between the
data and the models.
FIGURE 4:
short term,
fixed,
value maximizing
Alternatives
Choice making
Implementation &
Evaluation
Environment
no cost constraints,
no time constraints,
precise, quantifiable
highest value,
computational strategy
closed system,
quantitative implementation,
no evaluation
disregarded
DECISION ANALYSIS MATRIX
MODELS
Organizational
short term,
attainable,
satisficing
cost constraints,
time constraints,
partially quantifiable
rules of thumb,
judgemental strategy,
open system,
procedural,
qualitative and quantitative
criteria
sensitive
Political
long term,
limited,
acceptable
no cost constraints,
no time constraints,
nonquantifiable,
constantly redefined
no- 'right' decision,
compromise/bargining strategy
open system,
continual evaluation
dominant
The format in Chapter Three will be as follows: presentation
of the data collected on each firm; analysis of the data
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PROCESS
Rational
objectives
using the matrix; summarizing the findings on each firm; and
comparing and contrasting the two organizations.
************** ****
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CHAPTER THREE
Data and Analysis
This chapter will present the data and analysis of Maine
Credit Holdings, Inc. and the Bank of Boston/OREO
Department. The first section will give a description of the
site selection and methodology used for the field research.
The following two sections will give company background
information, data presentation, analysis and summary. The
format of the data presentation and analysis section will be
consistent with the six steps of the decision making process
- Objectives, Alternatives, Choice, Implementation,
Evaluation, and Environment as shown in Figure 4, the
Decision Analysis Matrix.
Site Selection
The organizations selected for study are similar in the
following respects-
* The organizations are connected with the two largest
banking institutions in the New England.
* They are in possession of a significant amount (>$100
million) of property.
* The organizations are actively managing and marketing
their real estate.
* Both have hired real estate professionals (without
prior banking experience) to help them manage and
market their portfolio of properties. MCH has 17
professionals on staff. The Bank of Boston has 4.
* They are closely scrutinized by federal regulatory
agencies as they sell off assets.
The organizations differ in the following respects-
* Maine Credit Holdings, Inc. is a Fleet Bank
receivership subsidiary under contract to the FDIC.
Therefore, the FDIC has authority to review any sell
decision.
* The Bank of Boston, while under pressure to dispose of
assets by the OCC, can make sell or improve decisions
with full autonomy.
* Most of the Maine Credit Holdings, Inc. properties
are located in Maine while the majority of the Bank of
Boston properties are located in Massachusetts.
However, both institutions have other assets scattered
around the country.
* MCH employs 180 people and has been in existence since
February 2, 1991. The Bank of Boston/OREO department
has been a separate department of the bank since 1988.
It employs about 100 people, the majority having moved
from other areas of the bank.
Methodology
It was my intent to conduct personal interviews with several
OREO executives at three local banks, Fleet Bank (Maine
Credit Holdings), The Bank of New England, and The Bank of
Boston. The Bank of New England was unable to fulfill my
request for interviews because they had recently been
purchased by Fleet Bank and were in the process of
consolidating their operations. I was only able to visit
Maine Credit Holdings, Inc. and the Bank of Boston. At MCH I
spoke with four individuals, the CEO, the Marketing Vice
President, one of the Marketing Managers, and the Asset
Management Vice President. At The Bank of Boston, I spoke
with the OREO Managing Director. I also spoke with two real
estate brokerage firms and two property management firms in
Portland and two each in Boston that have done business with
each company to gain additional insight into the decision
making processes.
Interviewing at both sites was difficult because of the
workloads of the interviewees, and the reluctance to offer
detailed information on organization business plans,
property selling prices, and allocation of funds. These
conditions exist because of what I believe are the two most
important factors guiding the management and disposition of
OREO property: the tight scrutiny of the federal regulators,
and the immediate focus of the banks to improve their
financial condition as quickly as possible.
The same questions were asked each interviewee. They were
designed to elict responses concerning the steps taken in
the decision making process within the firm. Although it was
the desire of the interviewer to tape each interview, all of
the participants requested they not be taped. Therefore,
handwritten notes were taken at each meeting.
Maine Credit Holdings, Inc. (MCH)
Background
In the winter of 1990, Portland, Maine-based Fleet Bank of
Maine, a subsidiary of Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc.
of Providence, Rhode Island, entered into negotiations with
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to acquire Maine
Savings Bank (MSB). MSB was the last major independent bank
in Maine with $1.3 billion in assets; it had been one of the
major sources of construction financing and mortgage lending
in the Portland area for many years. Their loan portfolio
consisted primarily of residential and condominium
construction financing and mortgages, but they also were
lent money on commercial projects ranging from shopping
centers to hotels. The bank had suffered large loan losses
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from 1987 to 1989 because of its exposure to nonperforming
real estate loans during an economic slowdown due to the
regional and national recession. The current CEO of MCH, who
worked at MSB on asset recovery for two years, gave a
graphic example of the scope of the former bank's troubles;
"In December of 1988, Maine Savings Bank held $188
million of performing condominium loans. By December of
1990, $171 million out of the $188 million worth of loans
were nonperforming. The bank had to take a $91 million
charge-off against those loans."
The FDIC, acting in its role as the regulator of state
banks, intervened in 1991 to try to limit the hemorrhaging
resulting from the losses. Their strategy, ultimately, was
to entice a better capitalized bank to take over the
institution.
Fleet Bank of Maine acquired Maine Savings Bank on February
2, 1991. The FDIC paid Fleet Bank $19 million to assume
about $1.2 billion in Maine Savings Bank deposits. The
payment by the FDIC was, in effect, a subsidy to get Fleet
to take over the bank. As part of the agreement, Fleet
agreed to handle approximately $400 million in troubled
assets from Maine Savings Bank. In the agreement, there are
incentives for Fleet to successfully work out the assets and
the FDIC will pay all of the administrative expenses for the
work-outs. David Barr, spokesperson for the FDIC explained
their reasoning;
"From the FDIC standpoint, this is a better agreement
because there is no interruption in the work-out. We
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would have to familiarize ourselves with the assets
whereas Fleet is likely to keep some of the Maine Savings
employees on board. Those employees already are familiar
with the assets."(Heymann, 1991, p. 11)
MCH was created as the vehicle to work with the
nonperforming assets and OREO properties. Technically, they
are a "receivership" company. While they are owned and
funded by Fleet Bank there is a contract between MCH and the
FDIC for a term of five years.
The literature explaining the role and function of FDIC
receiverships is extremely complicated, full of many
references to state and federal banking legislation and
recent court decisions affecting these regulations. Much of
the information is beyond the scope of this thesis, however,
there are a few points worth mentioning. First, upon the
inability of an insured institution to meet its depositors
demands, the FDIC must immediately pay insured accounts in
cash or make available to each depositor equivalent accounts
in another bank. Second, if they liquidate a institution,
the FDIC is motivated as a receiver to maximize the failed
institution's assets in order to reimburse the insurance
fund as subrogee of the depositors (Myers, 1990, p. 227).
This is basis for the purchase of Maine Savings Bank by
Fleet Bank. Fleet Bank got the "good" deposits of the failed
bank and is working on the "bad" deposits through its newly
formed subsidiary, MCH, which is charged with trying to
maximize those asset values. The CEO explained the
difference between MCH and a typical OREO department;
"MCH is a servicer to liquidate assets for the FDIC and
Fleet. It is different from the OREO departments of
banking institutions because it is not concerned with
preserving capital or ensuring adequate reserves. I see
MCH as a real estate management and liquidating company."
MCH employs approximately one hundred and eighty people (See
Appendix A for Organizational Chart). Under the Chief
Operating Officer, the three main departments are Loan
Recovery, Asset Management and Marketing. The majority of
the personnel are banking support staff and workout officers
located in the Loan Recovery area. These employees have a
traditional banking background and many were formerly
employed by Maine Savings Bank. The Asset Management
Department has fifteen employees of which nine are real
estate professionals without prior banking experience. The
Marketing Department employees six real estate professionals
without prior banking experience. MCH is currently
contemplating hiring additional experienced real estate
staff because it will soon be servicing the "bad" assets
from a second local bank, Maine National, acquired by Fleet
when it purchased the Bank of New England in April of 1991.
Data Presentation
The overall objective of the firm is, as stated above, to
maximize the value of the assets which it has acquired
through the FDIC. The FDIC plays an important part in
determining the intermediate objectives (sales by quarter,
by year, etc.) through its review of the yearly and
quarterly business plans created by MCH. The plans detail
the process of management and disposition of the assets and
give target goals for property disposition. For the
reporting quarter ending March 31, 1991, MCH sold $5.2
million worth of real estate which was 102% of their goal.
The movement of an asset from loan recovery to asset
mangement to marketing is called a "disposition continuum"
by the CEO. The search for alternatives in the decision
process begins when the property is in loan recovery. The
Asset Managers are assigned responsibility for a project
based on their expertise and workload. The Asset Management
department tracks properties in the Loan Recovery area so
they are aware what properties will soon leave foreclosure
and become OREO. They start preparing a management plan with
a budget for each property to limit liability exposure,
preserve value, and gather information useful to the
marketing department. The complexity of the plan is highly
dependent on the type and value of the property. Commercial
properties with tenants and vacancies require intensive
management more so than a single family residence. The
managers are given relative autonomy to create plans which
are then reviewed by the Vice President of Asset Management
in weekly meetings. The department contracts with outside
property managers to oversee day to day maintenance
operations at the properties. The property managers are
asked to submit reports on suggested improvements to the
property which are reviewed by the Asset Managers.
The bank's marketing department search for alternatives is
conducted with the traditional marketing techniques of real
estate brokerage and advertising. They are interested in
finding legitimate buyers who will pay prices as close to
the appraised value as possible. The use of appraisals
differs depending upon the value of the property. Properties
under $50,000 are sold without appraisals. Properties under
$5,000,000 must have at least one appraisal completed by an
independent MAI appraiser, and properties over $5,000,000
must have at least two appraisals completed by separate MAI
appraisers.
Outside brokers are given exclusive four month listings for
each property. They are required to detail their activities
weekly to the marketing agent at MCH. As one broker said;
"Generally, there is no difference working with MCH or an
individual seller except for two important points- one,
they can and do negotiate with buyers on their own and
two, you cannot bring them a buyer who has 'done (the
FDIC) harm' in the past. "
The pricing of the property is contingent upon the
appraisals received and an internal net present value
analysis. However, brokers do bring buyers whose offers vary
significantly from the listed price because of a problem
with perceived value. Simply put, the market does not
believe the property is worth the listing price assigned by
the bank.
If a property does not sell within a listing period, the
Marketing Manager can recommend to relist the property at
the same price; offer it at a lower price; or market it
through a "reserve" auction (the selling price must greater
than a minimum price set by the auctioneer) or through an
"absolute" auction (an auction with no minimum price). The
FDIC reviews all repricing or auction recommendations of
properties through an Oversight Committee (presently
consisting of one person) at Fleet Bank in Portland. MCH
meets with the FDIC committee once every two weeks.
The decision to sell a property is made by the Asset Review
Committee on all properties less than $1 million. The
Committe consists of the Marketing VP, Asset Management VP,
and the head of Valuation. For properties between $1-8
million the decision is reviewed by the CEO. All sales over
$8 million must have prior approval of the Case Review
Committee which consists of the CEO, VP of Asset Management,
VP of Marketing, Valuation, and the FDIC Oversight officer.
They meet bimonthly to review past sales activity, large
pending sales and to anticipate upcoming deals. The review
is usually a formality because the effort required to
negotiate a deal has been completed by Marketing prior to
the meeting.
Delays on sales have occurred because the FDIC has changed
the appraisal process or sales justification procedure.
Because it takes up to six weeks to get an appraisal, any
change in the process can result in a legtimate buyer
dropping out. These uncertainties have caused some
consternation within the company;
"The problem with the FDIC is the bureaucracy. It seems
they are more interested in the means than the end. They
need to publish a set of rules so we know what to
expect."
Another interesting choice is available to the bank rather
than a straight yes or no. As part of the agreement between
MCH/Fleet Bank and the FDIC there is also a "put option"
available to the bank for certain assets. Fleet Bank has the
right to "put back" to the FDIC any asset which it does not
want or does not think it can market within two years of
acquisition. However, MCH has an incentive not to put back
properties because part of their earnings are tied to the
amount of value they are able to recoup for the FDIC.
The bank uses a typical purchase and sale agreement drawn up
by its corporate lawyers. Maine Credit does not provide
financing of properties nor does it agree to fix up or want
to fix up properties before sale. The buyers are ready with
their own financial-resources to assume ownership so the
closings are relatively straightforward. Given that the
purchase has been reviewed at the senior level or by the
regulatory agency, if appropriate, the marketing department
moves quickly to close the deal.
The evaluation and followup of the sell decision is done by
the FDIC through its oversight role and regulatory
responsibility to maximize value on the assets. The FDIC
must account for all funds realized from the sale of the
properties marketed by MCH. They may take a more active role
in evaluating sell decisions if the obtained values are
significantly less than the appraised value. They may want
to ensure that the actions taken by MCH to obtain maximum
value are appropriate. Communication between the FDIC and
MCH is critical to ensure that decisions on properties can
be made by the lowest responsible employees. This avoids
costly interruptions in the disposition continuum.
The critical interaction between Maine Credit Holdings and
the environment occurs at two levels. The first interaction
is the important roles of the Asset Managers and the
Marketing Managers. Asset Managers must maintain contacts
with outside property managers, tenants, construction
managers, and city and town officials. Marketing Managers
are actively involved in representing the company in
purchase negotiations. The company has hired real estate
professionals who are comfortable dealing in these roles.
For instance, of the five Marketing Managers, two have had
experience as residential brokers, one as a commercial
broker, one as an asset manager, and the last has corporate
real estate experience and has earned a Corporate Commercial
Investment Manager (CCIM) designation. The second level of
interaction with the environment occurs internally between
MCH and the FDIC.
The overall roles of MCH and the FDIC are being constantly
redefined because adjustments are made to improve the
disposition process, maximize value and maintain
accountability. The local real estate environment in which
MCH must deal is relatively straightforward. While the
market conditions are changing over time, the rules of
engagement are no different than the normal buyer/seller
activity between private concerns. The uncertainty over
determining value maximization, necessary for appeasing the
FDIC, is created by MCH's uncertainty over future market
behavior. The firm is motivated, through regulation, to sell
based on today's market conditions, and is not attempting a
hold and sell strategy. The important external forces
influencing MCH's decisions include the local real estate
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market activity, the local economies at each location, the
inundated appraisal system and the political pressure
applied by the FDIC.
Analysis
Objectives
The Rational Model objective is value maximization.
Publically, MCH states that they desire to sell the
properties they hold at the highest net value possible and
to reduce liability exposure for themselves and the FDIC.
However, they do not have fixed or highly structured
objectives placed upon them. The contract with the FDIC, the
most important factor influencing their goal setting, does
not state specific goals that must be met by MCH. This model
does not fully describe MCH's goal setting.
The Organizational Model objective is to seek attainable
goals. Analyzing MCH's objectives setting while assuming
they are operating under an Organizational Model framework
presents an interesting scenario. The incentive for MCH to
maximize value is based on a contract with the FDIC. Because
the FDIC is paying the operating bills for MCH, the interest
of the company may be to simply follow policy and procedure
rather than attempt to proactively manage the assets. As an
organization, they may seek a course of action that is "good
enough" to satisfy the FDIC so they will get paid. In other
words, they are looking to meet the interests of the FDIC
which may be more than just value maximization. However,
this model alone does not accurately match MCH's objectives
setting function.
The Political Model objective is to seek goals which will be
acceptable to external constituences. The "acceptable"
assumption of objective setting is, arguably, the strongest
match to MCH's activities. The contract between the FDIC and
MCH does not set specific goals for MCH to reach by quarter
or year. The parties are able to negotiate disposition
objectives for each quarter, etc. MCH is also seeking more
business, "bad assets", from other failed instituitions
taken over by the FDIC in the near future. As only one of
four or five receivership companies in operation, the rest
being in Texas, MCH is in an advantageous position in the
Northeast as long as they perform adequately for the FDIC.
The employees at MCH seem most concerned with satisfying the
FDIC's wishes.
Alternatives
The Rational Model assumes there are no cost and time
constraints and the amount of information is unlimited; the
search for and evaluation of alternatives is precise,
exhaustive and quantifiable. This is not the situation with
MCH. Their search is limited because they are obtaining and
comparing only as many buy proposals as is acceptable to the
FDIC. Because of the contract, MCH's search also has limits
since they cannot consider hold and improve or hold and sell
scenarios. They are faced with a time constraint, the
contract length, but little cost constraint, all bills being
paid by the FDIC. The "put" option is also not covered by
Rational Model assumptions about alternative search. This
information cannot be matched to the Rational Model.
The Organizational Model search for information and
evaluation of alternatives is limited with constraints. This
matches the data best. MCH has constraints imposed upon it
by the FDIC. They cannot improve a property to capture
value. They have a limited amount of time to seek a buyer
for a property before they have to keep it or "put" it back
to the FDIC. The FDIC actively reviews most buy proposals so
MCH does not have full autonomy to evaluate all
alternatives. MCH has little risk in not maximizing the
return on an asset. To get the FDIC to accept an alternative
is a benefit to MCH. They are reimbursed for all expenses,
earn money based on assets sold, and gain goodwill with the
FDIC for future disposition contracts of assets from other
failed banks.
The Political Model assumes that evaluation of alternatives
is constantly redefined as more information is gathered.
There are limits to investigating and solicting offers from
prospective buyers that meet the desires of the FDIC.
However, MCH always has an "out", the ability to give back
an undesired asset. This allows them some bargining power
because the FDIC does not want any assets returned. MCH
knows this and can ask for greater flexibility to dispose of
properties. The FDIC can modify its criteria for accepting
an offer. Information gathered by MCH is used by the FDIC to
make changes in policy or procedure as necessary, e.g., the
number of appraisals needed before marketing high valued
assets has been changed. These conditions that redefine the
search for alternatives happen infrequently, therefore, the
Political Model does not match the data.
Choice Making
The Rational Model choice making is based on a computational
strategy, whereby, the property disposition choice comes
down to the rational decision of accepting the highest
legitimate offer for the property. However, this strategy is
not being considered in this case. MCH is not considering
all offers because they are restricted from two activities
that could secure higher net value for a property -
improving an asset by committing additional funds and/or
offering financing to prospective buyers. These incentives
could reduce the risk to a buyer such that they would be
willing to pay more for a property. The price could be high
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enough to offset the extra cost to the FDIC. The managers at
MCH are limited in making value maximizing decisions by
regulations and restrictions, so their choices are not based
solely on a quantitative analysis. Another "nonrational"
restriction is the FDIC decision not to sell to people who
have "done harm" to them. What if these people have access
to money now and are willing to buy at the highest price?
These limitations are contrary to a utility maximizing
decision, so the Rational Model is not consistent with the
data.
The Organizational Model choice making is based on a
judgemental strategy. At MCH, there is an extensive
judgemental review process prior to making a choice on a buy
proposal. For higher valued assets the judgement of the CEO
and Marketing VP are critical in accepting offers. The FDIC
exercises judgement when it recommends that additional
information be gathered before approving deals. On lesser
value assets, the judgement of the Marketing Managers and
Marketing VP become more important. They do not rely just on
a NPV analysis. They were hired to make independent
decisions (depending on asset threshold values) in order to
expedite the disposition process. The Organizational Model
does not fully account for the bargining and compromise
strategies used by MCH and the FDIC. This model does not
fully represent the data.
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The Political Model choice making is based on a compromise
and bargining strategy. There is a strong tendency for some
decision choices at MCH to end up being negotiated. There is
no "right" decision to be made on a property that has been
through foreclosure and is trying to be sold in a shaky
marketplace. The FDIC is willing to negotiate with MCH or a
buyer because they would rather have MCH handle the asset
and dispose of it at an acceptable value than continue to
fund it. The cost of maintaining an asset is so prohibitive
that the tendency is to work out a solution that will allow
the disposition to proceed. MCH's employees do not want
sales to fall through on which they have expended time and
effort. The bargining to finalize a deal is more important a
factor than obtaining the highest value. The Political Model
criteria is consistent with MCH's choice making.
Implementation and Evaluation
The Rational Model standards for implementation and
evaluation are predetermined. A computational choice making
approach to decision making explicitly values the timing,
cost and acceptance of risk during implementation. It is
assumed there are no other issues other than selling the
property to the highest bidder. No evaluation is needed
because all alternatives have been reviewed and the decision
is based on a financial analysis. Because the data suggests
62
that MCH is making choices using a Political Model strategy,
it does not appear that the Rational Model applies to these
decision steps. In most real estate sales transactions the
implementation and evaluation are are relatively
straightforward. The fact that MCH does not offer financing
does simplfy implementation for the bank. The property
either goes to a closing quickly or does not depending of
the ability of the buyer to secure their financing.
Typically, once a property is sold no post sale evaluation
is needed. MCH faces a more complicated situation. Closing a
sale in today's market is very difficult because perception
of values is inconsistent among different parties. There is
also uncertainty over the availability of financing.
The Organizational Model implementation and evaluation steps
follow policy and procedure. The qualitative and
quantitative aspects of the decision are equally important.
As would be expected in an arrangement with the FDIC, these
steps are based on policies and procedures described in the
contract. Deals must meet the requirements of the
regulators. The justification of the deal is almost as
important as the deal itself.
The FDIC review of high value deals prior to sale and
post evaluation of deals at periodic visits allows them to
change the process of disposition if they are not satisfied
with the results. The FDIC does have a say in implementation
of a sale through the post-sale review process. They make an
effort to analyze the sales of properties over certain
threshold values. They are also required to document the
success of their efforts for Congress. Therefore, the FDIC
continuously evaluates the performance of MCH's sales
results to see if expenses versus revenues are justified.
These steps are used to ensure that properties are sold for
an acceptable price with proper justification. The
Organizational Model matches this data.
To illustrate the importance of justification of
decisions, the FDIC, after a recent evaluation, requested
that all properties over $5 million have two independent
appraisals completed on them before sale. This effectively
slowed down the disposition of these properties by eight
weeks because of the backlog in the appraisal system.
The Political Model assumes that implementation is an open
process subject to discussion and all decisions are to be
continully evaluated until all constituences are satisfied.
MCH's and the FDIC's roles in this process have been
detailed above. MCH is responsible for implementing
decisions according to the rules of the FDIC. MCH does not
evaluate decisions for their own purposes. Therefore, the
Political Model does not match the data.
Environment
The Rational Model assumes that the environment is
disregarded during the decision process. MCH makes decisions
in an environment dominated by its contractual and
regulatory relationship with the FDIC and the activity in
the marketplace. It must adapt its decision making to
outside forces as often as necessary to meet the general
goals imposed upon it by the FDIC. For instance, if the FDIC
issued a proclamation to auction all properties within two
months MCH would be obliged to do so. The Rational Model
does not fit the situation at MCH.
The Organizational Model assumes the process is sensitive to
environmental influences. As stated above, the most critical
factors are the market activity and the FDIC contract.
Increase sales activity at high relative prices and all
other issues become moot. Other important environmental
factors are the FDIC oversight role, the appraisal system,
and the brokerage network. Sensitive is not a strong enough
word. The Organizational Model assumptions do not match the
data.
The Political Model assumption of a dominant environment
matches the data. The regulatory oversight of the FDIC and
market activity control the day to day operations of MCH.
They are forced by contract to follow the procedures of the
FDIC. MCH does have a bargining position with the FDIC which
they use to try and gain control in some instances, but,
generally, decisions are made at the FDIC's discretion.
In summary, after analyzing the decision making process
against these three models it is clear that no one model is
adequate for understanding the issues affecting MCH. Instead
of simply taking the properties under their control and
selling them to the highest bidder, MCH is constrained by
contractural obligations, and motivated by riskless profit.
The Decision Matrix for Maine Credit Holdings, Figure 5 on
page 67, highlights the most significant model at each step
of the decision making process. MCH's decision making
reflects all three models at different stages of the
process. MCH's disposition objectives are influenced by the
political arrangement with the FDIC. Their alternative
search is conducted for finding the highest value though
some constraints limit their activity. Choice making is
based on compromise and bargining in order to obtain the
"best" deal to satisfy the interests of the FDIC.
Implementation and Evaluation is modeled on policies and
procedures by both the bank and the FDIC because of
regulatory guidelines. The environment's influence on their
decision making is dominant. MCH works for the federal
government and and reacts to the market. Three out of the
five steps are matched to the Political Model. The close
contractural relationship with the FDIC significantly
influences their decision making process.
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Bank of Boston/OREO Department
Background
The Bank of Boston is a New England based superregional bank
Alternatives
Choice making
Implementation :
Evaluation
Environment
holding company with assets of $31 billion at March 31,1991.
The corporation and its subsidiaries provide a broad range
of financial services to individual, corporate,
institutional, and government clients as well as other
banks. As a national bank they are under the regulatory
purview of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) while the FDIC provides insurance coverage on deposit
accounts.
The bank has been significantly affected by the regional
recession. The Corporation's 1990 Annual Report described
the situation this way;
"The Corporation has been a real estate lender for over
forty years. While it has had experience with the
cyclical nature of real estate markets, the simultaneous
deterioration in New England and several other markets
nationwide has had a significant effect on the quality of
the Corporation's domestic commercial real estate
portfolio. In 1990 and 1989, the common denominator in
many of these markets has been overbuilding and high
vacancy rates which have triggered a shortfall of
revenues. This effect has been experienced with respect
to all types of properties and many borrowers have been
unable to service their debt. As a result, domestic
commercial real estate nonaccrual loans and OREO have
increased substantially since 1988. At December 31, 1990
they were $1,180 million, compared with $1,104 million at
the end of 1989 and $615 million at the end of 1988."
(Bank of Boston, 1991)
Of the $1,180 million of nonperforforming assets on December
31, 1990, $652 million were OREO property. The bank goes on
to acknowledge that they may experience additional
deterioration in its real estate portfolio in the future
including substantial increases in OREO properties.
The bank is actively managing the nonaccrual loans and OREO
in an effort to minimize their losses. They have created a
new department called The Restructured Real Estate
Department, commonly called the OREO/Real Estate Department,
which is staffed by over 100 experienced real estate lenders
and workout specialists. They have hired several real estate
professionals to fill top management positions within the
department. The Managing Director of OREO/Real Estate
commented;
"I hired these people to provide an overall management
function. They comprise the top two layers of my staff to
oversee the outside contractors we use to manage and
dispose of property."
In contrast with Maine Credit Holdings, Inc., Bank of Boston
utilizes their existing banking staff to a much greater
extent during the disposition process. They are utilizing
their existing resources because they believe the problem is
much more sensitive to the market conditions than to the
type of internal management. In fact, the Director feels
that real estate professionals are not needed at his
department except in top management positions to review
proposals.
Data Presentation
Nonperforming assets, especially OREO, are a tremendous drag
on corporate earnings. In 1990, Bank of Boston spent $30
million on expenses for OREO properties. Their ultimate goal
is to maximize the value of the portfolio. The bank has
already written down the value of the portfolio, so they are
able to wait for improvement in the market as long as they
are willing to absorb the carrying costs. The Managing
Director said that the OREO department does not have goals
for disposition of the property. He believes that the
ability to dispose of properties is so sensitive to the
market that unless one can predict the future the goals
become meaningless.
Their search for and analysis of alternatives is
concentrated in house. They start the search for
alternatives in the loan workout area as does MCH. Once a
property reaches OREO the Director relys on the upper level
staff to handle all decision making concerning necessary
maintenance and repairs. They screen information from the
outside property management companies hired to oversee the
properties. If a property needs extensive work to make it
more marketable the bank is willing to spend the funds. The
Director feels that the bank has a greater range of
possibilites to maximizing value than a receivership company
does;
"I believe the bank has an easier time of disposing of
properties than a receivership company would. Essentially
(MCH) is working directly for the FDIC and must follow
their rules which are designed to dispose of property as
quickly as possible. We look at each property and make
decisions based on the interests of the bank."
The bank does not have staff or marketing personnel directly
contacting buyers. They are using independent real estate
brokers to market the properties at each location. They
believe the brokers are the most efficient mechanism for
reaching qualified buyers. The support staff are assigned
properties to oversee and are asked to actively manage the
outside brokers on a weekly basis. The brokers are given 90
day exclusive listings.
The criteria for establishing the range of choices is made
using an internally generated net present value analysis.
The bank does consider improvements to existing buildings
and land if the analysis indicates they can capture greater
value for an asset. In one instance, the Bank of Boston was
left with 90 acres of undeveloped land from a foreclosed
subdivision. Analysis had indicated there was no market for
land but there was a demand for the houses. They chose to
invest $1 million to build 10 more homes on the land in
order increase the attractiveness of the project to
investors.
Some of the decisions making is influenced by accounting
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principles guiding the disposition or improvement of assets
held by banks. Capital expenditures depress corporate
earnings so they are avoided unless the justification is
strong. The bank will provide financing to qualified buyers
because they want to continue to earn interest on the loans.
If property can be sold at near current market value they
believe that lending money to buyers is justified. As
explained in Chapter One, there are accounting issues,
specifically FASB 66, that dictate the conditions of lending
on foreclosed properties.
The choice to sell an asset or improve a property is made by
the Managing Director using information from the brokers, a
net present value analysis, and the upper level staff
recommendations. The OCC has the authority to review past
sales data to check on the documentation of the disposition
process. The bank is required to justify each sale or asset
improvement. The Director indicated that the justification
documentation is one area that needed improvement.
Because the Bank of Boston provides financing on many of the
properties it sells, implementing a sell decision can be
time consuming. The buyer must go to a separate department
within the bank to start the loan review procedure. Once
funds are disbursed through the bank and the new owner takes
possession of the property, the asset is removed from the
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OREO department.
A decision to improve a property requires expenditure of
additional bank funds so this must be justified with a
financial analysis and market data in order to proceed.
As previously stated, the OCC, in its regulatory role, does
post evaluation of sales and improvement decisions.
Internally, the department decision making is also evaluated
on a quarterly basis for reporting purposes.
There is a big difference between the Bank of Boston and
MCH, and the interaction with the environment. The bank does
not use its own staff to market and manage properties. The
real estate brokers and property managers have the majority
of the contact with the marketplace. This insulating effect
may or may not impact the effectiveness of the department.
The department interacts with the environment at other
levels including the contact with the OCC and the loan
department of the bank. The OREO department is a fully
integrated unit of a $30 billion corporation while MCH is a
temporary subsidary created to handle a unique situation.
The scope of their environment is varied. The bank has
property in over 20 states with 60 percent of them located
in New England, 10 percent in Florida, 3 percent each in
Georgia and Texas, and 24 percent in the rest of the
country. The primary factor influencing the OREO decision
making at the bank is the market activity. If there is
sufficient interest, the properties will be disposed
quickly. If not, the bank will contemplate additional
expenditures to capture future value.
The political system, especially the OCC, is the next most
important influence. However, the bank, because of past
scrutiny is now valuing its assets to market and taking
charge-offs quickly in order to move the properties into an
active management stage. A positive force for the bank will
be its ability to extend financing to qualified buyers. If
the illiquidity in the credit market continues that may be
an important factor in their success.
Analysis
Objectives
The Rational Model objective is value maximization. The OREO
Department's stated objective is to maximize the value of
its real estate assets in disposition. For the Bank of
Boston, the most important financial measurement of their
success is yearly earnings. Because of the possession of the
OREO properties, earnings suffer because of reduced lending
capability and higher expenses. The bank is motivated to
take those steps necessary to increase both short term and
long term earnings. The data indicates that the OREO
Department can pursue and is willing to pursue value
maximizing objectives as in the Rational Model.
The Organizational Model objective is to seek attainable
goals. There would seem to be no incentive for the
organization to seek only "attainable" objectives. The OREO
department staff is motivated to capture the greatest value
on these assets if they understand that the process helps to
ensure their employment! The Managing Director indicated no
explicit disposition objectives were set except to recapture
as much value as possible. However, without set objectives
it is unclear how the staff's performance is assessed. If
their performance cannot be assessed, a Rational Model match
to the data is unlikely. But, considering the narrow purpose
of the department and urgency of the situation the short
term, fixed objective setting of the Rational Model are
strong.
The Political Model objective is to seek goals which will be
acceptable to external constituences. Since the bank is not
constrained by many external constituencies the objectives
setting by a Political Model seems unlikely. Indirectly, the
OCC is interested in their justification procedures, but as
long as the bank is progressing toward improving their
capital position OCC is satisfied.
Alternatives
The Rational Model assumes there are no cost and time
constraints and the amount of information is unlimited; the
search for and evaluation of alternatives is precise,
exhaustive and quantifiable. The Managing Director said the
department relys heavily on the net present value analysis
produced internally to generate values for various options
including immediate sale, hold and sell and improve and
sell. The search is conducted with the use of the outside
brokers over as long a period as is necessary to obtain
reasonable offers on a property. This matches the Rational
Model assumptions of finding precise, quantifiable
alternatives.
The Organizational Model search for information and
evaluation of alternatives is limited with constraints. Time
and cost constraints of holding onto the property are high.
However, the department does not want to accept low offers
on properties if the bank will have to acknowledge another
loss on its balance sheet. They are willing to accept risk
which suggests that the Organizational Model is not as
appropriate a match for this step as is the Rational Model.
The reliance on quantitative analysis of alternatives is
strong.
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The Political Model assumes that evaluation of alternatives
is constantly redefined as more information is gathered.
Given that the bank is not immediately influenced by any
external constituences, this model does not seem
appropriate. The OCC does have strict rules on the amount of
capital the bank needs to carry on its books and has
actively encouraged the bank to trim its exposure to real
estate assets. Nevertheless, as long as the bank is above
minimum capital requirements and is actively managing their
assets they have relative autonomy in searching for options
on property disposition including capital improvements. The
Rational Model's emphasis on quantifiable criteria more
closely matches this process.
Choice Making
The Rational Model choice making is based on a computational
strategy, whereby, the property disposition choice comes
down to the rational decision of accepting the highest
legitimate offer for the property. At first glance, this
would be a consistent match. The final decision is made
based on an NPV analysis which is created in-house. However,
I only interviewed one person in the department, the
Managing Director. If his testimony is correct, all
disposition decisions are made by himself. This would
indicate the use of judgement; an Organizational Model
strategy.
The Organizational Model choice making is based on a
judgemental strategy. The Managing Director's autonomy to
make decisions, with a financial analysis as support, is a
strong argument for an Organizational Model match. The
Director cannot have the time to analyze all the explicit
and implicit assumptions backing up the data presented to
him on each property. He is operating with some uncertainty
and must rely on rules of thumb to expedite decisions.
The Political Model choice making is based on a compromise
and bargining strategy. The bank is interested in giving
financing out on properties to increase selling activity and
to earn fees and interest income from additional lending.
Compromise may occur when a property is sold with financing
instead of cash because the bank is assuming additional
risk. However, their overall strategy is not based on
bargining. The department wants to justify a decision choice
with qualitative and quantiative reasoning. The Political
Model does not match the data.
Implementation and Evaluation
The Rational Model standards for implementation and
evaluation are predetermined. A computational choice making
approach to decision making values the timing, cost and
acceptance of risk during implementation. There could be
complicated implementation and evaluation decision steps if
the bank decides to improve a property or offer financing on
a property. Various staff members, outside contractors or
other bank staff would need to get involved in the process.
The timing, cost and risk could not be explicitly valued.
The Rational Model would not apply in this case.
The Organizational Model implementation and evaluation steps
follow policy and procedure. The qualitative and
quantitative aspects of the decision are equally important.
In most cases is consistent with the data, the department
has the flexibilty to cut deals with buyers that best meet
their goals. This is consistent with the Organizational
Model. There are internal policies to govern the disposition
continuum. Other procedures are followed to meet external
regulations.
The Political Model assumes that implementation is an open
process subject to discussion and all decisions are to be
continully evaluated until all constituences are satisfied.
Except for periodic reviews by the OCC when they sample the
files of properties that had been sold, there is no
evaluation of sales. The department is heavily influenced by
the policies and procedures of a large banking corporation.
There is little room for discussion when it comes time to
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implement a decision. The Political Model does not match the
data.
Environment
The Rational Model assumes that the environment is
disregarded during the decision process. This is not true
with the OREO department. The environment plays a big role
in the decision making. there is a strong reliance on
outside brokers and asset managers to provide the
information necessary to analyze and price properties
internally. There is also the indirect influence of the OCC
on the decision process. The top management of the bank have
complete authority to change the decision process. Clearly,
the Rational Model does not match the data.
The Organizational Model assumes the process is sensitive to
environmental influences. Yes, the firm is sensitive to
environmental influences but it does not disregard or is
dominated by them. The OREO department is cognizant of the
OCC desire for adequate justification of sales so they
perform the necessary tasks to the OCC's satisfaction. The
use of input from outside contractors and appraisers in
setting prices shows they are willing to rely on external
feedback to move properties. The bank's top management has
authority to change the department's focus at any time.
However, it seems obvious the bank has structured the
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department to have some autonomy to sell properties. The
Organizational Model assumptions are seen in the data.
The Political Model assumption of a dominant environment
does not match the data. Only with regard to the market
activity which dominates both MCH and the Bank of Boston's
decision making. OCC has a less dominant role than the FDIC
does at Maine Credit Holdings. The Bank of Boston is still
completely independent though they are operating under
unusual scrutiny. The autonomy and flexibility to manage
their assets shows that they are relatively unconstrained by
the environment.
In summary, no one model fully describes the process. The
Bank of Boston strategy to let the OREO department make its
own management and disposition decisions and the bank's
relative freedom from regulatory oversight allows the
process to follow a more rational path.
The Bank of Boston Decision Matrix, Figure 6 on page 82,
shows a greater reliance on rational decision making during
goal setting, search and analysis of alternatives and choice
making. Implementation and the evaluation of decisions and
the influence of the environment are most similiar to an
Organizational Model of decision making. The conclusions
could be skewed because I only interviewed the Managing
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Director of the OREO department. The opinions of department
staff, other bank officials, or the OCC are needed for a
stronger conclusion. For instance, it cannot be ignored that
the department functions within a very large organization
which is in a very regimented business. The influence of
organizational goals, policies and procedures, and internal
staff politics cannot be underestimated.
be aware of.this limitation.
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Comparison of Maine Credit Holdings, Inc and the Bank of
Boston/OREO Department
The two matricies give a graphic representation of the
differences and similarities between MCH and the BOB/OREO
department. Quickly, one can see that these organizations
are operating under different decision making conditions.
Even though one model does not fully address or consider all
the factors involved during the management and disposition
of the real estate assets, each matrix has a dominant model.
MCH's process is heavily weighted toward the Political
Model, and the BOB/OREO department's process is a closely
correlated to the Organizational Model.
Some of the similarities and differences of MCH and the
BOB/OREO department were outlined on Page 46 in the
beginning of this chapter. Several of these points are
critical in prejudicing each firm's decision making. MCH's
contract with the FDIC is the most important factor which
distinguishes their decision process. As shown in Figure 6,
the matching of objectives setting, choice making, and
environmental influences to a Political Model is consistent
with desire for acceptable solutions (fast dispositions) in
a dominant environment (the FDIC & Federal Government).
The BOB/OREO department's relative independence from the
external environment is the greatest influence on their
decision making process. They are attempting to follow a
highly rational course of action when disposing of real
estate. They look at unlimited options (sell immediately,
hold and sell, and improve and sell), and use a
computational choice making strategy (npv analysis). These
options do expose them to certain levels of risk. More
importantly, the corporate culture significantly impacts
their decision making. The department operates according the
rules and regulations of the department. This influence
cannot be trivalized.
The two processes resemble each other during the
implementation and evaluation stage because of the
organizational emphasis on following rules and regulations.
Each of the firms follows procedures on closings and
evaluation of sell decisions. Some differences do occur
because MCH is a subsidiary corporation and the OREO
department is a specialized line unit of the corpration.
MCH's policies are geared toward satisfying FDIC regulation
while BOB/OREO's are intended to fulfill the corporation's
primary objective of improvement in the balance sheet and
secondary objective of OCC satisfaction.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusion
The effectiveness of the decision making at Maine Credit
Holdings and The Bank of Boston/OREO Department is hard to
judge at this time. Each company is still actively managing
and selling assets and will be doing so for some time to
come. It is evident that the banks are encountering new
types of decision problems that are unfamiliar to them.
Typically, when a bank lends money on real estate, it is
expecting fixed rewards for its risk and is primarily
concerned with the security provisions of the loan, such as
the fair market value of the pledged assets. The bank, as
lender, also looks to the existence of resources and cash
flow to ensure repayment of principal and interest.
Now, as the owner of real estate, the bank assumes the
equity position in which the decision making context is
entirely different. Instead of being accounted for in the
coupon rate of the loan, risk is now limitless. The bank's
capital is exposed to all the risks of ownership. The fixed
reward of the loan is now replaced by a theoretically
unlimited upside potential. To manage and sell the real
estate efficiently, the organization and management must
understand this basic shift in outlook. As owners, they must
work to create value economically and to proactively manage
their assets.
Banks also need to understand the complicated and often
inconsistent nature of real estate selling. Net present
value analysis of various options is just one step in
deciding what to do with a property. Pricing a property
"right" might not be the best strategy for selling it
quickly. Frequently, painting the outside of a building a
different color or auctioning the property off at a higher
price may work! Those banks that are willing to inject
creativity and flexibility into their decision making
process will have greater success in disposing of property,
especially in a depressed market. The hiring of real estate
professionals to make decisions is a correct response to
address this issue. Their experience and insight are needed
to identify the most cost effective approaches to selling
property.
The disposition process is dominated by two environmental
factors. The first factor is authority of the regulatory
agencies to dictate and direct a bank's activities.
Generally, their outlook is short term because of the crisis
facing the banking system. The FDIC is charged with
maximizing returns to creditors, so they look to sell assets
as quickly as possible. The OCC is interested in pressuring
the banks to dispose of OREO property in order to improve
their capital position. As all parties (the FDIC, OCC,
banks, and receiverships) become more experienced in
managing and selling assets, the relationships should become
more cooperative than adversarial. Therefore, decision
making should improve. The second factor is the activity in
the marketplace. If liquidity returns to the the
marketplace, sales will increase quickly. A general economic
expansion combined with increased liquidity would render
this discussion meaningless.
Clearly, Fleet Bank (Maine Credit Holdings) and The Bank of
Boston have two distinct OREO organizations. MCH, as it
makes decisions on real estate, is making money while
insulated from risk. The Bank of Boston is trying to limit
the amount of money they have already lost while they are
still exposed to substantial risk. Maine Credit Holdings
should continue to do what they have been doing, using real
estate professionals to agressively market their properties.
If a reccomendation is made, it would be for them to
streamline the decision process so sales could be
consummated quickly. This would require the cooperation of
the FDIC. The Bank of Boston should consider utilizing
auctions more frequently, for two reasons. First, the cost
of holding OREO property is very prohibitive and second, the
strategy of expending funds on some properties in an attempt
to capture value is suspect.
Streamlined receivership companies, such as MCH, which are
staffed by real estate professionals, should be superior to
a bank OREO department in selling assets. If given the
necessary autonomy by the FDIC to choose creative,
innovative selling strategies, the real estate pros should
be more successful in their mission. If financing of
properties is made available, sales will increase
dramatically. Meanwhile, the Bank of Boston is operating an
organization within an organization. Banks are notorious for
their multi-layered, heirarchal structures. Their decision
making has traditionally been very conservative and
methodical. Though the Bank of Boston/OREO Department says
they have been successful to date, it is doubtful they have
the ability to modify their regimented style so that "fleet
of foot" decisions can be made. Clearly, they need to
consider hiring additional real estate professionals in
senior decision making positions or creating a separate
subsidiary company to handle assets outside the corporate
decision loop. These organizations must be tailored to fit
the creative decision making tasks, by utilizing the
appropriate structures and managerial expertise.
APPENDIX A
Maine Credit Holdings, Inc.
Organizational Chart
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